This paper reviews two relatively new tools for automated formal analyis of security protocols. One applies the formal methods technique of model checking to the task of protocol analysis, while the other utilizes the method of theory generation, which borrows from both model checking and automated theorem proving. For purposes of comparison, the tools are both applied to a suite of sample protocols with known aws, including the protocol used in an earlier study to provide a baseline. We then suggest a heuristic for combining the two approaches to provide a more complete analysis than either approach can provide alone.
Introduction
Security protocols based on cryptographic primitives are used today to protect computer systems and network transactions from malicious attacks. These protocols have been known to be notoriously hard to design due to their complexity. Many subtle attacks have been demonstrated that are di cult to catch b y manual analysis alone. There is therefore a need for formal automated tools to assist in the design of security protocols.
Many researchers have recently applied automated and semi-automated formal techniques to analyze security protocols. These tools fall into roughly two classes : those based on theorem proving e.g., 4, 10, 6 and those based on model checking e.g., 8, 9 , 7 . Tools di er in the degree of automation and expressiveness; often more automation is traded o against reduced expressiveness. Moreover, the assumptions made in modelling protocols make some tools better suited than others in catching certain classes of errors. These di erences indicate that we might nd tools that complement each other.
Model Checking and Theory Generation
In this paper, we compare two recently developed automated tools: Brutus 8 , which is a model checker, and RVChecker, which is based on Kindred's theory-generation approach 5 .
Brutus is a model checker specialized to analyze security protocols, with a built-in model of the adversary. It uses standard state space analysis techniques to check if the model satis es the speci cation. If it does not, then Brutus comes up with a counterexample showing where the speci cation breaks. Although model checking is almost entirely push-button" in nature, Brutus sometimes comes up short in that the protocol might be far too complex to handle due to state-space explosion, or the counter-example might be too complicated to understand exactly what assumption breaks. Even if these do not happen, it is possible that the protocol breaks only when a certain con guration of multiple runs occurs, and there is no way to automatically gure out which runs are important for analyzing properties of interest.
RVChecker is a theory generation tool based on Revere 6 which is based on belief logics. The core idea in this approach is to produce a nite representation of the set of all the facts derivable from a protocol speci cation. Verifying a particular property o f i n terest then simply becomes testing for set membership. The advantage of this approach lies in its automation, and in the high level handling of security protocol properties, thereby helping the designer x incorrect assumptions about the system and its environment. The obvious disadvantage of this approach lies in the di culty of seeing how failure of certain assumptions can translate into a real attack on the system. For a fairly complicated interaction between assumptions, it might b e v ery di cult for a human designer to gure out exactly what is going wrong.
The strengths and weaknesses of these two approaches suggest ways of combination. In the remainder of this paper, we study their performance on a suite of two protocols with known aws. We compare the performance of the tools on these two protocols. Based on this, we suggest a new method of analysis based on a complementary combination of the two tools.
The Protocol Suite
We ran each o f Brutus and RVChecker on a suite of two protocols, both of which are known to have a ws. This suite includes the Tatebayeshi-Matsuzaki-Newman TMN protocol used by Kemmerer, Meadows and Millen to compare three analysis tools -the Interrogator, InaJo and the NRL Protocol Analyzer 4 . Using this protocol thus serves to provide a baseline comparison between the two tools investigated here and the three systems investigated in that article. Our suite also includes the buggy namestamping protocol presented by Dolev and Yao DY in their paper on algebra-based analysis of security protocols 3 . The chosen protocols help to illustrate the relative strengths and weaknesses of the two v eri cation approaches. The known attack on the Dolev-Yao protocol is achieved by syntactic manipulation of the messages, which indicates that a model checking approach that explores all possible operations on messages might catch this bug. On the other hand, in the TMN protocol, parties perform key exchange based on beliefs about the authenticity of the other party, so it seems that a belief logic based tool such a s R V Checker might catch errors in this protocol.
Tatabayeshi-Matsuzaki-Newman Key Exchange Protocol
The Tatabayeshi-Matsuzaki-Newman TMN protocol for key exchange 11 , features a server S with a public key and two network nodes A and B who wish to exchange a session key through the server. The protocol consists of four messages: denotes a large random number generated by principal X, and denotes bitwise exclusive-or.
After a run of this protocol, A and B use Rb as a session key. The protocol falls victim to several attacks. One attack results from properties of the public-key and symmetric encryption algorithms used RSA and XOR, in which a second set of users can capture some of the messages from the rst protocol instance and trick the server into revealing the key. A second class of attacks results from the fact that no authentication takes place in the protocol, so it is possible for an intruder to masquerade as any of the other principals in the protocol and disrupt the network by, for example learning the session keys of principals or convincing A that he is securely communicating with B when in fact he is communicating with Z. These attacks are more clearly outlined in our analyses in Sections 2 and 3. Section 2 describes Brutus and the analysis of the two protocols using Brutus. Section 3 describes RVChecker and the analysis performed with it. In Section 4 we discuss the results of our analyses and in Section 5 we propose a heuristic to combine the two approaches. Finally, i n Section 6 we o er concluding remarks and suggest avenues for further research.
Brutus
Brutus is a model checker specialized for analyzing security and electronic commerce protocols 8 . Like most model checkers, Brutus is based on an operational description of the behavior of participating agents in the protocol, based on which, a suitable modal logic is de ned. Properties expressed in this logic can then be checked against the model using state space analysis. However, unlike a general-purpose" model checker in which the user must specify a nite state model of the intruder, Brutus has a built-in model of the intruder.
In this section, we rst give a brief overview of how Brutus models a protocol and how i t de nes and checks properties of interest. Then, we use Brutus to model and analyze the TMN and Dolev-Yao protocols.
The Model
Brutus speci es that the protocol must follow a particular model. While this allows us to formalize the protocol description and check the corresponding logic in a straightforward way, w e also lose some expressiveness in the process. I M is the set of messages known to the principal executing the instance S.
P is a process description given as a sequence of actions to be performed. These actions include the pre-de ned actions send and receive , a s w ell as user de ned internal actions such a s begin-response and end-response. internal actions can be used to keep track o f the internal state of an instance.
The intruder, Z, is not bound to follow the protocol and the intruder process neither includes a sequence of actions P Z nor a set of bindings B Z . Instead, at any time, the intruder can receive a n y message or it can send any message it can generate from its set of known messages I Z .
The states of all processes put together form the global state of the system. Let be the set of global states of the system. The transition relation for the system can be written as ! S A M where is the set of global states, S again is the set of instance IDs, A is the set of action names which includes send and receive , and M is the set of all possible messages. A transition of the system from state to state 0 can be represented as sam ,! 0 .
The Logic
The property o f i n terest is speci ed in a rst order logic with nite quanti cation and the past-time temporal operator.
We n o w give the syntax of the logic. Atomic propositions in the logic are instance IDs, instance variables, message constants and variables, and combinations of these as per the message construction rules de ned in Section 2.1. A well formed formula w in the logic is de ned as follows:
if f is an atomic proposition, then f is a w .
if f is a w , then :f is a w .
if f 1 and f 2 are w s, then f 1^f2 is a w . if f i s a w a n d s is an instance variable, then 9s:f is a w . if f is a w , then 3 P f is a w . 1 The semantics of w s in the logic are de ned over the trace of states and actions of the system = 0 1 1 : : : n , and can be given by the following recursive de nition of the satisfaction relation j = :
h ;ii j = m 1 = m 2 i i m 1 = i m 2 , i.e., the interpretations of the two messages in the ith state must be the same.
The formula h;ii j = s Knows m i i m 2 I j for some instance H j in i such that S j = s h ;ii j = s A m for some user de ned action A i i,1 sAm ,! i .
The usual semantics of j = for boolean and temporal connectives apply. Now, if we need to model check a given property p de ned in the above logic, we de ne a xpoint operator corresponding to the temporal operator used. The state space can also be encoded as a boolean expression. The xpoint operator is then applied to a suitable composition of the state space expression and the property formula. When the computation reaches a xed point, we can check whether the property holds for our system. If the property does not hold, the resulting formula will encode a trace which shows how the protocol can be broken.
A detailed treatment of model checking can be found in the book by Clarke, Grumberg and Peled 2 .
Analysis
We n o w describe how w e used Brutus to model and analyze the TMN and Dolev-Yao protocols. Each analysis of a property described in this section ran in under a minute on an Intel Pentium II 300 MHz machine running Linux. Brutus identi ed some of the aws in both the protocols under consideration, however, it did not identify all of the known aws due to limitations in its expressiveness.
In the analysis that follows, I stands for the intruder and all other letters stand for honest principals or trusted servers. 1 As in propositional temporal logic, 3Pf is true at state i, i f 9 some prior state j; j iwhere f holds.
Dolev-Yao analysis
The initiating and responding instances of each honest principal are modelled as shown below each corresponds to one session: two sessions and A initiates using one session; the intruder is able to obtain the message as shown in Figure 1 . Authentication: To c heck authentication, we c hecked the following two properties :
1 8a:fa internal end , initiate 00 ; B 9 S b : S b :P = B^3 P S b :P internal end , respond 00 ; a g 2 8b:fb internal end , respond 00 ; A 9 S a : S a :P = A^3 P S a :P internal begin , initiate 00 ; b g
We claim these properties are authentication" properties the rst claims that if A nishes initiating a message to a honest principal B, then there is a session in which B responded to this message at some earlier point of time. The second claims that if B nished responding to a message apparently from A, then it was indeed A who initiated the send of that message in some session at some time in the past. Note that these are rather weak conditions of authenticity which rely on nametags attached to messages rather than something more secure. This arises from the fact that there are no signatures or shared secrets involved in the protocol. Properties of this kind have also been referred to as correspondence properties by W oo and Lam 12 . For a single run of A and B, both properties check out to be true. This happens because I is unable to get M through a replay attack, and so if A or B get the message they expected, it must have been legally generated.
However, if either A or B is allowed to have more than one session, then the intruder I can replay the message and make sure that A or B completes a session thinking that the message which originated from I actually came from an honest principal. One such attack is shown in Figure 2 . Here we h a v e the same model as in the previous attack, viz., two sessions of B and initiation by A. In this case, A thinks that B is talking to her, while B thinks he is talking to I, so the authentication property does not hold. Since Brutus considers all principals to be honest, we cannot express honesty properties in the protocol. This is a limitation in the expressiveness of the speci cation logic.
TMN analysis
In TMN, we h a v e three honest principals: the initiator A, the server S, and the responder B. In the above model, small letters such a s a are used in place of principal names such a s A t o indicate that the party represented by the letter p may not be the principal P, but some other party Q playing the role of P. The current v ersion of Brutus requires secret keys generated by A and B to be represented as symmetric keys, with a symmetric key for I. This representation allows I's key to replace that of A or B wherever I replaces A or B. H o w ever, representing secret keys in this manner ties the key to the principal name for a given message. Thus, if I attempts an attack in which it replaces a principal's name with its own masquerading as that principal, it also e ectively changes the key, often rendering the attack ine ective.
We c hecked the following classes of properties: The rst property means that I cannot read messages passed between A and B The second property means that in addition, I cannot masquerade as S while communicating with A.
Brutus nds both properties to be false. First, if the intruder is allowed to take on the role of the server i.e., the name I" can replace S" in messages, then a very simple attack i s possible, as shown in Figure 3 . If we assume that the intruder cannot masquerade as the server, then we can still nd an attack. With a single session of S we are only able to nd an attack that allows I to discover R B , but with two sessions of S, I can also nd R A . This latter attack is shown in Figure 4 . Authentication: We c heck the same authentication properties as for the DY protocol. However, in this case, Brutus deems both properties to be true. This is because it is not possible for Brutus to represent the secret key of I with the principal name of B in the same message as discussed earlier.
Multiple Intruder Collusion: Simmons describes an attack on the TMN protocol described in 11 in which the homomorphic property of the keys is used. In essence, the key used in a single valid run of the protocol is replayed by t w o colluding intruders who could be two di erent sessions of the same intruder. Since this attack depends on the homomorphic property o f k eys, which cannot be expressed in Brutus, Brutus fails to catch this aw.
RVChecker
RVChecker is a protocol analysis tool inspired by the tool Revere developed by Kindred 6 . Revere features two new techniques: theory generation and the RV logic, an extended BAN-style belief logic 1 . Combining these features results in a tool that is fully automatic; given a protocol speci cation no further action is required by the user to analyze the protocol. Whereas Revere is written in SML, the paper's rst author developed RVChecker entirely in Java, so it is also portable to any platform for which there is a JVM available. RVChecker employs Kindred and Wing's theory generation for reasoning about small theories in limited logics 5 . Theory generation is a syntactic method of theorem proving based on a saturation approach. The concept is to produce a nite representation of a possibly in nite theory generated by a set of rules and assumptions. Their approach divides the rules of a logic into shrinking" and growing" rules as decided by any w ell-de ned measure and repeatedly applies only the shrinking rules, essentially guaranteeing that the process will come to a halt. Then to test whether a speci c formula is a consequence of the rules and assumptions, a backward-chaining search o v er the growing rules is applied, which will also guarantee termination. The su cient condition for termination provided by Kindred and Wing is the restriction that a shrinking rule must still shrink even when all of its premises that can be met by the conclusion of a growing rule are removed.
A consequence of this condition is that given a set of rules and a candidate measure, it is possible to automate the process of checking a logic for termination under theory generation. This allows the development of a general-purpose theory generation algorithm that can automatically prove a n y judgement o f a n y logic that satis es these termination conditions. Both Revere and RVChecker implement this algorithm, formally described in Kindred's thesis 6 .
In addition to being fully automatic, this algorithm has the potential to be quite fast; in his thesis, Kindred gives gures for the analysis of several security protocols under several di erent logics; the longest analysis took Revere 50 seconds to complete on a 500 MHz processor. RVChecker was not designed with processing speed as a primary consideration; the protocols analyzed here took on the order of 5 minutes to check on a 500 MHz Pentium III.
RV logic
RV is a belief logic developed by Kindred 6 with a core similar to the Burrows-Abadi-Needham BAN logic of authentication 1 . The innovations of RV lie in its rules for responsibility and a technique of explicit interpretations. The belief rules of RV are essentially the same as those of BAN and will not be discussed here; the responsibility properties attempt to account for the possibility of irresponsible behavior on the part of the principals of the protocol, while explicit interpretations represent an attempt to address the dangerous idealization step necessary to analyze a protocol using the BAN logic. In this section we will describe RV rules in terms of the symbols listed in Table 1 , for consistency with the notation of Kindred 6 . So, for example, the rst rule in Figure 5 reads if P sees M, then P sees M 0 ". BAN-style protocol analysis necessarily involves generating idealized versions of the messages in a protocol and doing analysis on these idealized protocols rather than the concrete protocols intended. The risk is that the idealization might contain hidden assumptions about the relative safety o f a message; BAN fails to consider other possible interpretations of the same concrete message. RV addresses this by i n troducing a syntax for concrete protocol messages; the protocol is analyzed using the actual concrete messages intended for implementation, along with interpretation" rules that allow for the explicit idealization of the protocol. Kindred severely restricts these interpretation rules to prevent i n v alidating the rules of the logic 6 .
An interpretation rule must match one of the patterns shown in Figure 5 . In addition, the concrete message M cannot contain any v ariables speci c to one instance of the protocol, and may not contain any functions other than concatenation; the idealized meaning M 0 may not contain protocol instance variables or the encrypt function; and no concrete message may match more P M P M 0 P j Q j M P j Q j M 0 P j Q j M P j Q j M 0 Figure 5 : RV I n terpretation rule patterns. Here M matches all or part of a concrete message, while M' represents its intended meaning than one interpretation rule for a given protocol. This approach allows the explicit statement o f how the protocol is being idealized, and placing these restrictions on the interpretation rules means that they can be automatically checked, pointing out dubious idealizations to the user. Since nonces are not always used merely for freshness or randomness, but are also used to stand in for longer pieces of information, RV also allows nonce-binding operations to be included in the premises of the interpretation rules; we do not use this feature of the logic for either of the protocols evaluated here.
Responsibility
The RV logic also introduces the notion of responsibility in protocol analysis. Here the concept is that RV analysis allows one to determine whether or not the principals involved in a protocol are acting responsibly, as de ned by t w o properties: honesty and secrecy. Roughly speaking, the honesty property requires that a principal believe a n y possible interpretation of a message he sends, while the secrecy property requires a principal to believe that it is safe for any i n truder to see all of the data sent in a concrete message. RV derives these properties through the legit and maysee operators and rules described here.
Original interpretation rule
Corresponding legit rule P j Q j M P j Q j M 0 Q j M 0 Q j signedM;M s ; P ; Q Qj legitM s P j Q j M P j Q j M 0 Q j M 0 Q j signedM;M s ; P ; Q Qj legitM s P M P M 0 Q j M 0 Q j legitM Table 2 : Honesty rules corresponding to protocol message interpretation rules
The legit operator works in conjunction with the interpretation rules introduced in the previous section; when analyzing a protocol, for each i n terpretation rule, a corresponding rule is introduced, according to the proper rule from Table 2 . The RV logic also has rules that allow one to derive that the encryption of a legitimate or honest message is also honest, and the concatenation of two honest messages is honest. It introduces a concept of signed messages, with the idea that any message encrypted under a private or shared key or combined with a shared secret is signed. Then to check the honesty of a principal P in connection with a given concrete message M, it su ces to derive
P j Q maysee Y P j Q maysee X P j Q maysee fXg K P j Q maysee X;Y P j Q maysee X P K 7 ! Q P j Z maysee K P j Z maysee X P j Q maysee X P j Q maysee X P j K 7 ! Q P j Z maysee fXg K P j Q maysee X P j Q maysee Y P j Q maysee X:Y P j Q maysee X P j R maysee X P j Q K ! R P j Z maysee fXg K Figure 6 : RV's maysee rules P j legitM 6 .
The maysee operator communicates that it is acceptable for a given principal to see a piece of information. RV's maysee rules specify that if information is public, then any principal believes that any other principal may see it; a principal is allowed to see anything he or she has already seen before; a principal may see anything that an intruder may see, and so on. For a complete list of RV's maysee rules, see Figure 6 . To c heck secrecy properties in RV, the protocol analyst adds a principal I the Intruder and checks that for each message M and sender S, S j I maysee M 6 .
RVChecker Protocol Analysis
Protocol analysis with RV and theory generation involves several phases:
1. A speci cation is supplied, consisting of a set of messages between principals, a set of interpretation rules conforming to the restrictions listed above, a list of the principals involved, a set of belief goals for the protocol, and a set of initial assumptions about the beliefs of the principals involved.
2. Theory generation is applied to the initial assumptions to generate T 0 , the consequence closure of the assumptions under RV.
3. For each message M i with sender S i and recipient R i , the formula R i M i is added and theory generation is re-applied to compute the theory T i .
4. Secrecy is checked: S i j I maysee M i 2 T i,1 .
5. Honesty i s c hecked: S i j legit M i 2 T i,1 . 6. For each belief goal g, c heck that g 2 T n , where n is the number of messages.
In this section, we give the results of protocol analysis for the selected suite. RVChecker identi ed aws in both the DY and TMN protocols; here we present the analysis of each. The suite nicely points out some weaknesses of the RV approach, as well as its strengths; for example, we w ere able to nd aws through an inability to meet belief goals, but discovering these aws required extensive familiarity with the RV logic to isolate the necessary or awed additional assumptions. In addition, knowing that some dubious assumptions are necessary does not necessarily indicate how an attacker can take advantage of these assumptions while in these cases we knew of the attacks a priori, in actual analysis using RVChecker on other protocols this will not in general be the case.
Dolev-Yao analysis
RVChecker can quickly identify one fault in the DY protocol: it provides no authentication. One might assume that desirable belief goals for DY w ould be B believes it is A who says M," and A believes B says that it is A who says M" formally, A j B j A j M, however, since there is no signature and no previous shared secret of any sort, this belief-oriented set of goals cannot be achieved. In any case, the main goal of the protocol as introduced by Dolev and Yao is secrecy, so the belief goals can be weakened to the seeing" goals B sees that A said M" and A sees that B sees A said M", while we analyze the honesty and secrecy properties of the protocol. Even these further weakened goals cannot be reached without breaking an interpretation rule restriction: because RV and RVChecker do not allow compositional rules, there is no way for a principal to derive that when she sees X:fYg K and has the key K, then she sees X and Y together in the same message. Thus our interpretation rules include encryption and specify protocol principals so that we m a y connect the encryption key with the principal who may decrypt it: B f X g Kb The honesty goals require additional assumptions to be met. The rst required assumption is that A j A j M, which is necessary to assume because only the recipient sees the message in RVChecker's analysis. We also require the assumptions:
A j legit A A j legit B B j legit A B j legit B in order to get around the fact that namestamps rather than keys are used to provide authentication.
With these assumptions, it is easy to derive the appropriate legit belief for the rst message.
After the rst message, B A j M can be used to derive B j B A j M which allows us to derive the legit properties for the second message. The secrecy goals are also met, requiring only two assumptions: A jB maysee M, which seems obvious since A is sending M to B; and B j A maysee M, which seems reasonable once B sees that A j M. With these assumptions, RVChecker easily derives that the secrecy properties hold.
The DY protocol, however, was designed to have a secrecy aw; thus our results represent either a shortcoming of RV's secrecy rules meaning they are unable to account totally for multiple-run attacks or an invalid assumption. The assumption that B jAmaysee M allows the secrecy check to succeed for the second message; without it, B cannot derive that I maysee fMg Ka . T h us it might be tempting to conclude that this assumption is invalid; however, Dolev and Yao also give an example of a protocol with perfect secrecy, for which this assumption is required for RV t o derive the secrecy properties. This shortcoming is a result of a conscious design decision by R V's creator which results in a conservative approach to secrecy; thus sometimes these rules will lead to the conclusion that a secrecy aw is present when in fact none is. Here the secrecy aw comes both from lack of authentication and double encryption, but RV's rules do not allow us to isolate the double encryption as a source of the aw.
TMN analysis
Through analysis with RVChecker we w ere able to nd belief and responsibility errors in TMN. Since TMN is a key-exchange protocol, we start with the belief goals. Generally, w e w ould like t o have both A and B believe that Rb is a shared key between them, and further we w ould like both principals to believe that the other principal shares their belief, resulting in the goals:
Since there is no direct authentication in this protocol, however, the bottom two goals are impossible, so we will settle for the goals:
We also have a problem in that, as speci ed in Section 1.2.1, any i n terpretation rule which matches message 1 or 3 will match both, yet they have di erent i n terpretations; to solve this problem we add tags REQ and RSP to these messages which simulate the state that S would have to maintain in the concrete protocol. If we try to write the interpretation rules now, we nd one more problem:
as with DY, RV is unable to derive that if a principal sees X:fYg K , then that principal sees X;Y. Thus in our idealization step we h a v e already identi ed one potential attack: an attacker can change the names in the messages being passed around without changing the keys; thus he could change a message from A to S to say S:A:I: : : : rather than S:A:B: : : : . To x this problem, we encrypt the entire contents of messages 1 and 3 rather than just the keys: However, since the speci cation of TMN calls for bitwise exclusive-or encryption in the nal message, we cannot modify it to encrypt the entire contents. Instead, we will break the restriction that an interpretation rule cannot include any protocol instance variables, which is reasonable because in any single run, A only expects to get a key for one person:
Note that in this rule, S refers to a protocol constant, the server S.
To c heck our belief goals, we require several assumptions. Besides the jurisdiction assumptions involving which principals are allowed to control the keys used by other principlas necessary, the interesting assumptions are The rst sub-goal is the obvious jurisdiction assumption. The second sub-goal can be derived through our interpretation rule, if we can infer A j S j Rb. This inference requires the assumption A j Rb; that is, A must assume that Rb is freshly generated. In fact, this points to the attack found by Simmons 11 in which t w o collaborating intruders use keys which are not fresh to nd A's key.
The nal belief goal is also a source of di culty: to derive S j A Rb ! B, w e need to infer that, for some P:
Given the de nition of the protocol, it is a reasonable assumption that P = B, since B generates Rb.
We end up with an authentication problem, however: while we can derive that S B j A When checking responsibility, w e nd that under reasonable assumptions the rst three messages as modi ed will satisfy honesty, while because of the belief problem above, the fourth message cannot satisfy the honesty property, since A will interpret S's message as meaning S j A Rb ! B, and S does not believe this. Thus RV a ords two opportunities to nd this error although we admittedly added the third belief goal only because we suspected that its failure lead to the failure of the honesty c heck for the nal message. Similarly, the secrecy property fails for the nal message, because since S is not convinced that Rb is really a shared key for A and B, the maysee rules do not allow us to infer that S j A maysee Rb.
Comparison
In this paper we h a v e highlighted the approaches of two fully-automated protocol analysis tools, Brutus and RVChecker, by presenting their analyses of two cryptographic protocols. Since both tools found aws in both protocols, we attempt to sort through the advantages and disadvantages of each. In the next section, we suggest a heuristic for their combination, exploiting the advantages of both.
Brutus and RVChecker both represent fully-automated protocol analysis techniques; that is, given a speci cation, neither tool requires further intervention from the user to complete its analysis, in contrast to the tools examined in 4 . The speed of both approaches also allows a more interactive approach in that the protocol and assumptions can be changed and the results analyzed relatively quickly but both tools require signi cant knowledge of the underlying model used in analysis; Brutus Table 3 : Results of protocol analysis. YES indicates that the system identi ed the aw. Table 3 summarizes the results of our comparison. It is interesting to note that while both Brutus and RVChecker found aws in the TMN and DY protocols, the ty p e o f a ws found by each w ere somewhat di erent. For example, while both tools identi ed the authentication failure in TMN, RV w as able to suggest, without any speci c knowledge of the encryption schemes used, that it may be possible to attack the protocol with non-fresh session keys. And for DY, RV identi ed an authentication aw but even with a reasonable assumption which holds for a slightly modi ed but secure version of the protocol was unable to identify the security a w that Brutus easily identi ed. Therefore, while it might be tempting to claim that each tool always identi es certain types of aws, we can see from this small set of protocols that neither tool consistently identi es the same types of aws.
Combination
In addition to having the advantage of catching more aws when used in combination, the theory generation and model-checking approaches seem to present a certain complementarity. Analysis using theory generation and belief logics, as implemented in Revere and RVChecker, allows the identi cation of critical assumptions which allow or prevent a protocol from meeting its belief goals or from passing honesty or secrecy checks. Without prior knowledge of protocol aws, however, it may be di cult to see how the failure of an assumption can be marshalled into an attack; further, as in the case of the DY assumptions, it may be di cult to identify which assumptions are questionable. Using model-checking, as in Brutus, yields actual attacks, but especially for lengthy counterexamples, it can be di cult to discern why the attack w orks, or what assumptions about the protocol are being violated.
A Motivating Example
As an example, in the RVChecker analysis of DY, we w ere able to nd that the secrecy property fails if B does not believe that A maysee M; h o w ever knowing that this is a crucial assumption does not give u s a n y knowledge of how an attacker might take advantage of it. On the other hand, with our knowledge of how the attack w orks, Brutus was quickly able to nd an attack which yielded the message; however this does not give us a high level explanation of why the protocol might h a v e failed. Using RVChecker and Brutus in combination, we see that the protocol fails because B j A maysee M and we are given an example of how this aw can be utilized to yield an error.
Further, the fact that RVChecker needed both assumptions B jAmaysee M and A j Bmaysee M brings out the symmetry in the roles that might b e p l a y ed by A and B in an attack. This means that in Brutus, i f w e w ant the intruder to take on the role of B, w e can introduce additional runs of A and vice-versa. As discussed in Section 2.3, di erent combinations of runs of A and B lead to di erent attacks from that mentioned in 3 , one of which is presented in Figure 1 .
A General Methodology for Combined Analysis
In general, we can think of the following two w a ys to combine these approaches:
1. From Assumptions to Counterexamples: We can use RVChecker to identify crucial assumptions, and then use our knowledge of these assumptions to search for counterexamples in Brutus.
2. From Counterexamples to Assumptions: We can search for counterexamples in Brutus and use this knowledge to isolate important assumptions in RVChecker. In this section, we present short heuristics that are suggested by the previous example. In the next section, we show more examples that support these heuristics.
Assumptions to Counterexamples
To see how t o m o v e from RVChecker analysis to counterexamples in Brutus, observe that if an assumption held by principal A is both dubious and crucial for satisfaction of some property, then it most likely falls under one of two cases: In the protocols presented here, the counterexamples that were found by Brutus can be motivated in this fashion by failures found using RVChecker. For example, the extra assumptions needed for secrecy in Dolev-Yao point t o w a ys in which extra sessions of A or B can be utilized to generate an attack; we apply this heuristic to the TMN protocol in Section 5.3.
Counterexamples to Assumptions
In the second case, we w ould like to use RVChecker to determine which of a protocol designer's assumptions about a protocol fail in a counterexample generated by Brutus. T o combine the tools in this direction, we model the entire counterexample trace as a protocol in RVChecker; note that this model will have the intruder I involved as a participating principal. We then proceed to add assumptions about each of the principals until the goal properties secrecy, honesty, authentication, etc. become satis ed. Some of these assumptions will be about I. The assumptions held about I when he plays the role of principal Q will then indicate assumptions that the protocol designer either explicitly or implicitly made about Q and that I has used to subvert the protocol. Thus we can identify the faulty assumptions, which will hopefully lead to a better understanding and possibly a simple x to the protocol.
More examples: DY attack and TMN
In this section, we show h o w the methodology outlined in the previous section can be applied to the two protocols we h a v e studied. This pinpoints the assumption that both principals, particularly B must believe that it is safe for the recipient to see the message M, when in fact because of the lack of authentication it could potentially be an intruder receiving the message. This gives us some high-level insight i n to what went wrong with the design of the protocol.
TMN
We also applied both heuristics to the TMN protocol. In our analysis with RVChecker Section 3.3.2 we found that it was necessary either to change the protocol or allow the server S to use inappropriate interpretation rules to satisfy the goal S j A Rb ! B; and that to satisfy secrecy, w e required the additional assumption that S j A maysee Rb. So following rule 2 of our heuristic, we can model an extra session of S in Brutus and allow I to play both A and B; the result is the attack shown in Figure 4 , in which I manages to retrieve Ra from the server. Thus we arrive at the conclusion that the lack of authentication in this protocol results in inappropriate interpretation of messages and inappropriate assumptions that can be marshalled into an attack b y I .
Going in reverse, we can also identify these interpretation rule errors and faulty assumptions by modeling the trace from Figure 4 as a protocol and attempting to satisfy the secrecy goals. Of particular interest is the secrecy of the message which I receives from S revealing Rb. T o a c hieve the goal S j P maysee fRbg Ri , w e m ust satisfy the sub-goals S j I maysee Rb and S j S Ri ! I.
The rst can only be satis ed by assumption, which reveals our rst broken assumption in the original protocol this translates to S j A maysee Rb, when S has no proof that the key is actually intended for A. The second sub-goal can only be satis ed by forming interpretation rules that do not follow the patterns speci ed in 6 , since S must believe an unauthenticated message from I. It follows that in the original protocol S must believe unauthenticated messages from A and B, which highlights the second error in the protocol, that is, the lack of proper authentication.
Thus, in both cases we are able to apply our heuristics to the TMN protocol, producing a more complete analysis through the combination of the tools than we w ere able to produce with either alone; in addition, the combination of the tools is able to catch more errors.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we h a v e compared the approaches and capabilities of two cryptographic protocol analysis tools Brutus and RVChecke r b y analyzing two security protocols with known aws. Neither tool isolated all of the aws in these protocols, but each tool missed di erent a ws; the complementary nature of their approaches suggested that it might be possible to combine these tools resulting in a more powerful yet still fully automated approach to formal protocol analysis. We do not claim that the methods suggested here for combining these two approaches are rigorous or complete, however, these methods of combination represent a beginning. Future work could see how they can be formalized and extended beyond the two protocols presented.
